In an interview provided to the Christian Science Monitor (published on November 5, 1963), former President Eisenhower said, “The middle of the [political] road is all of the usable surface. The extremes, right and left, are in the gutters.” I concur with the sentiment. What concerns me now, and what has always concerned me, are political extremists.
Dr. Alan Renwick of the Political Studies Association has written a paper about the Alternative Vote system. He declares that AV “has three effects on the significance of fringe parties” and notes them as follows:
First, it makes it easier for them to win votes: a vote cast for a small party need no longer be “wasted”, as the voter can support one of the main parties with their second preference.
Second, AV makes it harder for fringe parties to win seats: parties adopting positions far from the centre ground are unlikely to pick up many second preferences….
Third, AV gives small parties bargaining power over large parties. In many seats, the leading candidates will need the second preferences of small-party supporters if they are to secure victory. The small parties are likely to seek policy concessions before agreeing to ask their supporters to transfer their votes to a particular party or candidate.
I tend to concur with each of these conclusions. There is not a whole host of countries where the reality of the effect of a switch to AV can be examined and conclusions drawn. On this matter, Renwick makes observations based on one country and one country alone: Australia. This is hardly a statistically significant sample. In any event, Renwick demonstrates his second point by example. An anti-immigration party that would have won a seat under a first past the post (“FPTP”) system did not win the seat with AV as voters for other parties did not transfer votes in such high a proportion to that candidate as other candidates. Based on this, Renwick cites Professor Ben Reilly as concluding that AV in Australia “has pushed the political system away from extremes and towards the ‘moderate middle’”.
Political analyst and President of YouGov Peter Kellner uses the same Australian example to come to a similar conclusion for the UK, that AV would be disastrous for the BNP. The BNP itself is urging its supporters to vote no. Writing in the Observer, Andrew Rawnsley jumps on the bandwagon. He declares, “AV is, in fact, the most extremist-resistant electoral system.” To select a blogger, the self-declared extremist, Reuben Bard-Rosenberg is voting against AV for a similar reason. He believes that under AV, extremists “are unlikely to stand a chance.”
I am sure other examples can be found of others singing a similar song, that if being opposed to extremists is the chief criteria, you should be in favour of AV. I disagree. In fact, I come to the opposite conclusion. I believe that if you are opposed to extremes and that is the chief criteria, then you should be opposed to AV.
I shall explain.
1. Voting patterns in the UK are, under the FPTP system, quite anti-extremist. We have never had a National Front or BNP MP. The Green Party has broken through with one MP, RESPECT had and lost an MP, but in the main, our MPs are on Eisenhower’s “usable surface” as opposed to “in the gutters.”
2. Consider core voters of an extremist party such as the BNP. At the moment, as a vote for the BNP is a losing vote, it lacks influence. If the very same voters could transfer their votes, as they will be able to if AV is installed, their vote could be influential.
Consider one constituency: Dagenham & Rainham. According to the BBC, the percentage votes to the four largest parties in this constituency at the 2010 general election were as follows:
Labour 40.3%
Conservative 34.3%
British National Party 11.2%
Liberal Democrat 8.6%
This seat has been viewed as a safe Labour seat. The Conservative Party did narrow the gap from 2005, but nevertheless it would still require a substantial change in electoral votes for Labour to lose this seat under the FPTP system.
If we take the BNP, it may be reasonable to assume that the anti-immigration stance of the party is the key reason for support for such voters. Those voters who made the choice to vote for the BNP due to conviction, or for a protest, have not influenced politics beyond their vote. But what if these losing votes were given a second chance with a transfer vote? I am not saying that they will, but it seems to me possible, that a Conservative Party candidate might make various promises about raising matters of immigration in the House of Commons if elected in order to try and win those crucial transfers. The local BNP could even formally endorse transfers in exchange for such promises. The influence of the BNP could lead to Labour losing and the Conservative Party winning this seat.
Of course, politicians in other parties often have the ability to pander to a racist vote, but under FPTP they need to directly win them away from those that might otherwise vote for a racist party. In an AV system, this requirement is not necessary; all they need to do is get such voters to transfer votes their way.
Renwick counters the effect of this by arguing that in Australia the mainstream parties refused to deal with the extremists and when some politicians did pander to the extremists in the 2001 election, the voters punished them. It is possible that such an effect could occur in the UK, but I would not want to bet on it and if AV is rejected in the referendum, I will not have to worry.
In one of those short discussions limited to 140 characters per comment, Arieh Kovler has suggested that the “far-right are anti-politics” and as such, either the BNP would not encourage their voters to vote for a mainstream party, or, even if they did, the supporters would not pay attention. I am not convinced. If a political party has power, it might as well use it. In the case of an AV system, the power it has is suggesting to which party supporters should transfer their votes. If it can be “paid” for this by extracting a favourable concession from the candidate from the other party then they might as well use it.
3. As Renwick notes with his first point that I quoted above, it would be easier for an extremist party to win votes. Even in a hotly contested constituency by major parties, a vote for a minor extremist party is not “wasted.” The voter can just transfer their vote from the extremist party to their preferred major party.
I simply do not know what additional proportion of the British electorate would vote for the BNP or other extremist parties if AV were installed as the voting system, but I can say that it will increase. This could be very worrying as it will give a spike to support for the BNP and could provide them momentum to grow their party to a much bigger size. Hence, even though I accept that it is more difficult for the BNP to gain over 50% of the vote including transfers under AV than to obtain a majority of the votes under FPTP both currently and in the short term, it is not obvious to me that this would always be the case. The long term benefit to an extremist party of the springboard of additional votes could be enormous.
4. It seems that many commentators are relying one example to prove their point: Crows Nest, Queensland, Australia in 1998. It is the One Nation party that is the extremist party. At the election, prior to transfers, the voting percentages for the top two parties were as follows:
One Nation 39.5%
National Party 38.3%
As can be seen, this would be a slight win for the extremist party under FPTP.
After the transfers were dealt with the following was the position:
One Nation 49.1%
National Party 50.9%
Consequently, what occurred is that the extremist party did not win under AV whereas they would have done under FPTP.
This is only one example, and it is not statistically significant. It is not mathematically sound to jump to numerous conclusions based on this. It would have hardly taken much of a change for the following to have been the case at the first stage:
One Nation 38.3%
National Party 39.5%
As can be seen, in this hypothetical example, this would be a loss for the extremist party under FPTP.
And in this hypothetical case, after the transfers are dealt with the following to be the position:
One Nation 50.9%
National Party 49.1%
If this had occurred (which is really not a huge change in percentages) then AV would have put in power an extremist who would not have been put in power by FPTP.
Conclusion
Despite that it seems that I have the weight of opinion of commentators against me, I remain of the opinion that the alternative vote system would increase the influence of the extremists. It is for this reason that I urge all readers to join me in voting “NO” on May 5. If my own reason is not enough to convince you, then surely the chance to annoy Nick Clegg must be tempting.
VOTE “NO” ON MAY 5.
