By Jurek Molnar
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There is social unrest in Great Britain at the moment, which looks very troubling. Media inside and outside the country are reporting about events where rioting mobs are attacking buildings, setting cars on fire and assaulting police officers. The incidents covered and debated are mostly attributed to “far-right” instigators. Domestic British politics is not my expertise, so I won’t discuss these events with regard to British circumstances. In reality, things are not so different anywhere else in Europe. Insurrections of this type could happen in most European countries at any time (or already have) and many people are concerned that some of the anger and frustration might spread to other places. I am not in the business of predicting the future and cannot say if that concern is justified or not. What I am interested in is to give some thoughts on the term “far-right”, that is used by journalists and commentators and given as the prime motive of people who engage in the destructive behavior, we have seen recently.
The term “far-right” is in itself very vague and seems to refer to a political position, which is strongly connected to the promotion and justification of violence. This may be true, but doesn’t reflect accurately the way the term has been embedded in the public discourse. We can use the term “far-right” as an equivalent to “fascist”, “Nazi” or “right wing extremist”, they are all interchangeable and serve the same purpose, which leads us to our first proposition:
A very strange feature of the term “far-right” (and its equivalents) is the effect that actually nobody wants to be identified as such. The overwhelming majority of people, who are called “far-right” would deny to belong to that category. The term is used as a description from outside. Somebody on the other side of the fence is “far-right”, very rarely does someone identify him or herself by that word. In the current political landscape of European democracies “far-right” parties exist, but its leaders and supporters will (in most cases) reject the designation. Most right wing or populist parties or movements identify as “center”, while deviations to “center-right” or “center-left” can occur. It is more often used as a slur than as a blueprint for identifiable political positions. People who are accused of being “far-right” are a lot more occupied with defending and distancing themselves from the term and its implications, than embracing it. What it does as a discursive tool is to create a pressure on individuals not to get identified with that association. On every occasion commentators and speakers who want to engage in the debate, try to distance themselves from the idea to tolerate or support anything that is “far-right” (or “fascist”). Politicians like Nigel Farage have tried (very unsuccessfully) to establish a gap between the “far-right” and himself. But at the same time, while nobody nowhere is ever in favor of the supposed ideological stance, a strange Angst is making rounds that if unchecked, “far right fascists” will take over Western societies in order to establish the next Nazi regimes. In other words: “far-right”, “fascist” or any other equivalent does not describe a political position. “Far-right” is a political term for being evil. The confusion of “far-right”, “alt-right”, “extreme-right” or “reactionary right” is the deliberate demonization of political enemies. This creates a lot of weird political struggles.
In Germany and Austria, individuals and organizations who are often specified as “far-right” or “fascist” are also suspected to wish for an end of democracy. The reaction of these “far-right” individuals is mostly to deny that accusation, presenting themselves as the “real democrats”. But this has of course no effect on the narrative that they want to destroy the parliamentary systems, which made Western politics great. The overwhelming majority of people and organizations, who are suspected to be “far-right”, “fascist” or anti-democratic, do not subscribe to that designation, since most of them are relying heavily on the democratic process to make their success legitimate. They think of themselves foolishly as deeply democratic parties and politicians. In a country like Great Britain, where historically no “far right” party ever formed a government, this contradiction has peaked recently, when a non-existent political organization like the English Defence League has been accused of commanding the “far-right” protests in Great Britain, only weeks after the electoral victory of Keir Starmer’s Labour party. The non-existence of a “far-right” political actor on the public stage is an even more convincing argument for many to believe it, since postmodern thought has established the idea that something that is not there must be a hard proof for its own existence. Nobody likes or promotes “far-right” ideas, but it is always on the brink of breaking through and crushing the fragile democratic structure. Who knows what it will do next?
We have established the idea that “far-right” is very often the description of someone, who will not agree with that designation. In postmodern terms it is a kind of “othering”, that does not accept the self-identification of the people it signifies with that term. In Germany and Austria the term “right” has become more or less equal to “far-right”. At the beginning of this year major demonstrations took place against the “danger of the right”, which were afraid that democracy would be abandoned if the popular “Alternative for Germany” (AfD) were to win the next elections. (Irony is lost on these people.) In the rhetoric against the AfD, which still succeeds in polls, there is no effective distinction between “right” or “far-right” or “fascist”. “Right” and “far-right” are the same, when it comes to certain people. No matter what these people think of themselves, they are labelled as “far-right” or “fascist” anyway. The inflated use of the term hence includes very diverse people like Jordan Peterson, Posey Parker, Andrew Tate, Marjorie Taylor Greene, J.K. Rowling or Donald Trump. This is also very interesting in regard to the efforts to establish self-identification as a pillar of society, which makes foreign designations of gender a crime in some cases. The noble idea that people are entitled to decide who they are and hence can subjectively determine what their identity is, also demands that everyone else has to accept these identities as valid. But this does not include those who are political dissenters. The term “far-right” has therefore become less of a political position, rather than a signifier who is considered an enemy of the current establishment, regardless of the content of his or her political ideas. We should also keep in mind that the inflated use of the term makes it much more difficult to determine what the actual meaning of “right” or “far-right” really is. But we should also keep in mind that the fact that this term and this designation in particular has become so inflated, deserves also our attention. The absence of defined boundaries around the term opens it up for another phenomenon, that is hard to explain, but can be described as: “far-right” is a metaphysical condition, that can only exist in a binary system of good and evil. It is important to note that the absence of defined boundaries to justify the use of the term in certain contexts and deny it in others, is the result of a transformation from defined and worldly into infinite and theological, not its product. Since “far-right” is more or less the substitute for “evil”, the consequences are visible to us: the term itself has lost its grip on reality and hence the political turmoil becomes a question of giving each other names instead of discussing problems and listening to controversial opinions. But is also hard to tell if the latter phenomena are also not idealized imaginations of a bygone past.
I am quite certain that at some point in our recent history “far-right” meant something. For sure there was some substance, that justified the use of the term, but I cannot see any meaningful interpretation now, that goes beyond “outside the socially accepted norm”. To be “far-right” is not a qualification regarding one’s politics, it is a designation that someone is an enemy of the state. It is a way to say that this particular person is standing outside the boundaries of civilized society. That is a dreadful state of things to say the least. Are there any hints or paths to solve this problem?
As a foreign designation that completely ignores the self-perception of the individuals it addresses, the term “far-right” is an effective tool of current powers to put a lot of pressure on individuals. To be designated “far-right” leads to a permanent state of self-defense, which is a major disadvantage in every debate. The first way to counterattack is not to give in to the social pressure that is created by the accusation. The best way to devalue the accusation is to accept it. If enough people are willing to do that, the accusation will lose its grip on people’s psyche. But we are certainly not there yet. Still many reasonable voices will emphasize not to be “far-right” and in permanent assurance to strongly support democracy and the idea of human rights. The fact that it hasn’t any impact on the debates, must not prevent us from looking at this point. Many people who are accused of being “far-right” will not subscribe to that designation. They still would like to make some distinctions, that will distance themselves from that label, thereby only contributing to that game, that makes it almost impossible to present a meaningful description. If we accept the counterargument, that “far-right” is a danger to our society, we have to ask what the term “far-right” actually means to pose such a threat. We cannot accept that this term remains largely undefined, only to be used when it is convenient. It does not make sense to require an exhausting definition, just a few cornerstones will do for a broader understanding.
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The first and most important cornerstone of such an understanding is the attitude towards the use of violence. “Far-right” types are usually scripted as violent, sadist thugs. They are people who either use physical violence permanently or promote the permanent use of physical violence, one way or the other. This image is very useful, when the current powers want to present themselves as promoters of peace, the rule of law and the opponents of violence, but it says very little about real life circumstances. And while it is true that classical fascisms were mostly thug regimes, the noble idea that democratic societies are not is not backed up by history. Dozens of horrible terrorist acts in the 70s and 80s affected several European countries, which reacted with harsh anti-terrorist laws and militarization of law enforcement. Politics is a violent business in itself, the question always was how to control it and keep it at a level below self-destruction. Western style democracies have managed to reduce the dangers of civil war after they had experienced wars (and civil wars) during their own history. The mechanisms to learn from civil war experience created consensual government and the rule of law. But instruments keep getting less precise and less functional. What worked yesterday, will not necessarily work tomorrow or already does not work today. Violence can be reduced, but not entirely avoided. There is always violence and counterviolence and the according narrative that this violent act was the answer to a violent act before. Wherever there is political turmoil, there is violence and justifications for it. We, for that matter, put our faith in the hands of technology and so, surveillance has become the main strategy of governance in democratic societies. If “silence is violence”, then surveillance can count as violence, too. Controlling the movement, the social interactions, the online personae, up to personal opinions, in public or in private, turned into a modus vivendi. And it creates violence by default, because human beings will always resist, cheat or sabotage. Political violence is a regular event in all historic societies and its use has not stopped because elections took place. What democracy did was to decrease the use of violence during a period of exceptional economic growth to a degree that prevents civil wars, but it would be naïve to think that it disappeared. If I had to make a case for the idea that a dangerous army of “far-right” thugs is out there, I would point to the thought of Rene Girard, that every violent act in the mind of the perpetrator is done as the necessary consequence of another violent act. Violence is a chain of violent acts that relate themselves to their predecessor and the phenomenon of violence is the conscious escalation of conflicts to a point of no return, sometimes by just one participant, sometimes by both. If there is “far-right” violence, which acts against the current state, there must be violence on the other side, too. People who are afraid of a possible right-wing insurrection, denying these people any legitimacy, are often those who have the greatest sympathies for Intifadas in other places. What they lack is not the ability to see violence, but the ability to see their own violence as a part of the problem. Reasonable people will ask for root causes, but somewhere someone – before it’s too late – has to stop, if violence should not escalate further. Motives, interests and incentives for escalating violence are in abundance and will not stop before no-return, if the idea is true that an army of far-right thugs is out there to hunt for the end of democracy and human rights. If people should believe it to be this way, democracy will certainly end, because this dire diagnosis will not be prevented by online censorship. There is no use in rejecting political violence, what matters is the control of violence by state actors and the general society. The recent increase in stabbing crimes all over Europe are noteworthy, because they amplify the obvious conclusion that these societies have successfully limited violent behavior on the side of the state and the general population. These times may be gone.
Nevertheless: I may be blind and stupid, but I don’t see the far-right armies of thugs anywhere in Europe. I personally don’t have the impression that any right-wing populist government or opposition in Europe wants to abandon democracy. And I can’t see that right-wing populists have a problem with free speech, since most of them are serious promoters of that value.
The second cornerstone then is the rejection of free speech. What is usually the moment when free speech gets inconvenient? Correct! If you are in charge. Then most people, who may have favored an absolutist free speech idea before, will – as head of a government – begin to mistrust others who are too outspoken of their minds. Free speech is only a problem, if one is not in power. Rosa Luxemburg famously wrote that “freedom means the freedom of the others”, but she wrote this in a situation where she herself and her fellow communists lived and agitated under censorship and political pressure, which led to her death eventually. It is a historical fact that communists in charge will never accept free speech at all. And it is very likely that supposedly “far-right” insurrectionists will also behave the same way, after they have stormed the Bastille. But this simple projection tells us a lot more about those in power, than about those who are revolting. No government is willing to accept more critique than necessary, which means the important critique comes from places the government is not able to control. But since control is the purpose of every stable government, the limits of free speech are set accordingly. In Germany the system of state broadcast agencies (“Öffentlich-Rechtlicher Rundfunk“) has become a propaganda tool for government policies, which use their tax funded program to outcompete independent suppliers and political opponents. The current censorship in Western democracies is not so much a direct intervention, which falsifies, manipulates and omits consciously, but the fact that dissent is simply ignored or in any other case criminalized.
It is hence another inconvenient fact for those in power, that the current sample of “far-right” extremists is clearly in favor of free speech and has a lot to complain about the dreadful state of administrative control over public expressions. There may be serious doubt they can hold to their commitment when they are in power, but that fear has been confirmed by the left-wing governments which are currently in charge, too. And this also means, that the “far-right” is not even close to any power and has obviously major difficulties to sustain its own political agenda. Since nobody wants to join them (at least rhetorically) the actual might of these “far-right” protests will decompose quickly. The current elites of Western democracies have developed a very effective trick to avoid the free speech debate. They have learned to consider themselves not be elites, but representing the voices of the downtrodden. This way, current powers have not to understand themselves as responsible for stable free speech conditions, but can become activists in an online simulation, where powerless “far-right” protests are permanently on the brink of overthrowing democracy and human rights. Journalists, celebrities, government bureaucrats and ivy league academics are able to imagine themselves to be part of the résistance. One has to keep in mind that these people feel this way, while they are in power. What will they think, if they are not? The idea of free speech is without a doubt an inspiring ideal, but there are few places, geographically and historically, where its praxis came close to its best version. To guarantee free speech for all, political systems must be exceptionally stable, well governed and highly stress resistant. None of these qualities can be attributed to any state in the world today. Free speech hence is not a question of who is power, but an intrinsic problem of power itself: how tight are its own rules for dissent?
The third cornerstone is the (alleged) rejection of democracy. There is all over Europe the ridiculous idea that right-wing populist parties and movement (who are also summed up as “far-right”) will try to abandon democracy. To explain why this idea is just ridiculous, one has to keep in mind that the principle of democracy when it emerged in ancient Greece had a completely different meaning that it has today. Greek democracy was the rule of the demos, the assembly of the free land-owning men. The classical demos is not “the people”, but the elite of the polis, who had a common interest and decided on the basis of a commonly shared political perspective. It took nearly 2000 years to extend the term democracy to a demos which is not just the group of the most rich and powerful men. The French Revolution and other events during the 19th century established the idea of the masses as a political actor, which had not existed in the times before. Marxist and socialist movements pushed the idea that the masses – proletarians, peasants or otherwise disenfranchised – had to be in charge, guided by some avant garde expert committee of course. But basically, all political struggles of the late 19th and early 20th century revolved around the idea how the masses could be introduced to the political stage. All political ideas, which try to derive political power from a collective point of view, are intrinsically democratic. Ideologically it does not matter if this collective is universal or particular. The NSDAP came into power not just by elections or constitutional processes that followed elections, but by claiming to represent the General Will of all (Aryan) Germans. The Bolsheviks also claimed that their power is an avant-garde representation of all proletarians. Both have in common that their dictatorship came into being by escalating the conflicts of mass democracy to a point of no-return. Legitimacy that comes from “the people”, whoever this is at any given point in time, is by default unstable. “The people” is a vague term by itself and a landscape of inclusions and exclusions on many different grounds in various historic eras. And one has to remember that the “Democratic People’s Republic of Korea” is in the North of the Korean peninsula. The most notorious totalitarian states and regimes of the 20th century have been fueled by mass democracy, the political expression of Rousseau’s volonté générale. Nazis and Bolshevik communists alike have been escalators of mass democracy, not their strict opponents. Democracy is not in itself good, it is just a particular way of organizing political conflicts. It can solve some and it can create or amplify some. Democracy is not immune to authoritarianism and it has used force and violence to govern its peoples. Mass democracy was heavily criticized during ancient times and had been opposed in the 19th century by thinkers like Nietzsche. This criticism was taken very seriously after WWII. Western democracies are examples how the general will of mass democracy is institutionally filtered, surveyed and monitored, driven by bureaucratic process, opinion research and all kinds of Deep State techniques. No matter who is in power, everyone will use the established one or create another for the same purpose. The current insurrections are a reminder that “far-right” at best is a reaction to a lack of democratic opportunities rather than attempt to abandon them. Their best argument remains that they have a place in democratic society, especially when they try to apply the rules. It is indeed ridiculous to think that the current opposition will try to abandon something that gives their battles legitimacy, purpose and moral gravitas.
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The conclusion is very simple: whatever “Far-right” meant some time ago, it doesn’t have a particular meaning now. The “far-right” is not in power. It is a kind of opposition nobody likes and wants to get associated with. The suspicion to support “far-right” policies, which are rarely defined, hypothetical and mostly made up, is far more damaging to any average person, than anything they say, express or agree on. “Far-right” (and equivalents like “fascist” or “Nazi”) are simply the representation of evil, like “murder”, “rape” and “torture” are evil. The reason these things are used as slurs and not as a bundle of political positions has to do with the fact, that a metaphysical location of enemy territory makes it much easier to dismiss the criticism. I cannot say if it is possible to have a government that is able and willing to do democracy and free speech without using violence or autocratic measures, but a possible path to that noble goal should be a list of principles I want to put forward:
- Political debates about violence and the criticism of violence must contain the idea that the use of violence is a conscious decision with a lot of consequences. Violence will be used one way or the other. Speaking about peace, but preparing for war, is a constant phenomenon in history. Since terrorists and freedom fighters are often the same, violence is means to an end. It does not provide moral superiority. What we have to think about is how we conduct violence and for what reason, because violence will escalate to a point of no-return, if our conscious decisions to stop the escalation comes late or never.
- Political debates about free speech should clearly indicate that opinions I don’t like have the same right to be expressed like my own. These words look great on paper but are hard to achieve and very rarely care current powers too much about it. If we decide to speak against current powers, we should not expect to be awarded with a medal for our non-conformity. It is a conscious decision to say contrarian things, and free speech is never granted.
- Political debates about democracy and dangers to democracy are at this point statements with an undisputed premise. And this premise is: democracy is sacred. The very state of calling something democracy makes it sacred. You can democratize the department of health, but what if you politicize it? My point of view is: Democracy is not sacred. It is a particular mechanism of governance. It has a history of success and failure and democracy is not a given fact, because someone claims to be democratic or calls political enemies undemocratic. The state of Western democracy is quite alarming, because everywhere political conflicts seem to escalate. It is not too far fetched to say that certain elements of mass democracy, especially the escalation of political divide, are coming back on a large scale. The extension of “far-right” to describe opponents as evil is debris from the 20th century, that hits societies, which have become vulnerable and are at some places in turmoil. The people who value democracy as a sacred institution, by calling their opponents “far-right”, will put their faith in the extension of the state apparatus. Democracy and the state, or more precise, democracy and their rule of the state become identical then. That’s where we are and what we have to change.
