From the second edition of the Encyclopaedia of Islam

Taḳiyya (a.), also tuḳan, tuḳāt, taḳwā and ittiḳāʾ, “prudence, fear” (see LʿA,

s.v. w-ḳ-y, Beirut 1956, xv, 401-4; TʿA, x, 396-8), and also, from the

root k-t-m, kitmān “action of covering, dissimulation”, as opposed to

id̲h̲āʿa “revealing, spreading information”, denotes dispensing with

the ordinances of religion in cases of constraint and when there is a

possibility of harm.

The Ḳurʾān itself avoids the question of suffering in the cause of

religion in dogmatics by adopting a Docetist solution (sūra IV, 156)

and in everyday life by the hid̲j̲ra and by allowing in case of need

the denial of the faith ( XVI, 108), friendship with unbelievers (

III, 27) and the eating of forbidden foods ( VI, 119; V, 5). This

point of view is general in Islam. But, as Muḥammad at the same time

asserted the proclamation of his mission to be a duty and held up the

heroic example of the ancient saints and the prophets as a model ( V,

71; III, 40; etc.), no definite general rule came to be laid down, not

even with the separate sects. Minor questions, which are very fully

discussed, are whether taḳiyya is simply a permitted alleviation

through God’s indulgence (ruk̲h̲ṣa) or a duty, if it is necessary in

the interest of the community.

Taḳiyya was never rejected even by the extreme wing of the strict

Ḵh̲ārid̲j̲ites [q.v.] although among the Azraḳīs in the related

question of divine worship when danger threatens ( ṣalāt al-k̲h̲awf

[q.v.]), it is often given as an example that one should not interrupt

the ṣalāt even if his horse or his money be stolen from him during it.

The advice is already old: “God gave the believers freedom of movement

(wassaʿa) by taḳiyya; therefore conceal thyself!” The principle

adopted by the Ibād̓īs, however, was that “taḳiyya is a cloak for the

believer: he has no religion who has no taḳiyya” (Ḏj̲umayyil, Ḳāmūs

al-s̲h̲arīʿa , xiii, 127-8).

Among the Sunnī authorities the question was not such a burning one.

Nevertheless, al-Ṭabarī says on sūra XVI, 108 ( Tafsīr , Būlāḳ1323,

xxiv, 122): “If any one is compelled and professes unbelief with his

tongue, while his heart contradicts him, in order to escape his

enemies, no blame falls on him, because God takes his servants as

their hearts believe”. The reason for this verse is unanimously said

to have been the case of ʿAmmār b. Yāsir [q.v.], whose conscience was

set at rest by this revelation when he was worried about his forced

worshipping of idols and objurgation of the Prophet. It is more in the

nature of ¶ theoretical speculation, when in this connection the

question of hid̲j̲ra is minutely investigated, that in certain

circumstances, e.g. threat of death, a Muslim who cannot live openly

professing his faith may have to migrate “since God’s earth is wide”.

Women, children, invalids and those who are tied by considerations for

them, are permitted muwāfaḳa (“connivance”); but an independent

individual is not justified in taḳiyya nor bound to hid̲j̲ra , if the

compulsion remains within endurable limits, as in the case of

temporary imprisonment or flogging which does not result in death. The

endeavour, however, to represent taḳiyya as only at most permitted and

not under all circumstances obligatory, as even some Sunnīs endeavour

to hold on the basis of sūra II, 191, has resulted in the invention of

admonitory traditions, e.g. raʾs fiʿl al-mudārāt “to be good friends

with unbelievers is the beginning of actual unbelief”. To prove that

steadfast martyrdom is a noble thing, the story is told of the two

Muslim prisoners of Musaylima [q.v.], one of whom allowed himself to

be forced to acknowledge the anti-prophet, while the other died for

the Prophet. The latter is reported to have said: “The dead man has

departed in his righteousness and certainty of belief and has attained

his glory, peace be with him! But God has given the other an

alleviation, no punishment shall fall upon him”.

Taḳiyya is above all of special significance for the S̲h̲īʿa. Indeed,

it is considered their distinguishing feature, not however always with

justice, as Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī in the Talk̲h̲īṣ al-Muḥaṣṣal protests

against al-Rāzī (see his commentary Muḥaṣṣal afkār al-mutaḳaddimīn wa

ʾl-mutaʾak̲h̲k̲h̲irīn, Cairo 1323/1905, 181-2). The peculiar fate of

the S̲h̲īʿa, that of a suppressed minority with occasional open but

not always unheroic rebellions, gave them even more than the

Ḵh̲ārid̲j̲ites occasions and examples for extreme taḳiyya and its very

opposite; even the Ismāʿīlīs, usually masters in the art of disguising

their creed, made the challenge to their leaders: “He who has 40 men

at his disposal and does not seek his rights is no Imām”. The Zaydīs

give as among the number of helpers who remove the necessity of

taḳiyya from the Imām, that of those who fought at Badr. It is a

common polemical charge of the Sunnīs, quoted from the writings of the

S̲h̲īʿīs themselves, that the latter, as followers of fighting

martyrs, are not justified in employing taḳiyya, while the Twelvers,

in particular, while representing the Imāms as examples compelling one

to resoluteness, appeal on the other hand to the conduct of ʿAlī

during the reign of the three first caliphs and to the g̲h̲ayba of the

Mahdī as examples of taḳiyya. Belief is expressed by heart, tongue and

hand; a theory of probabilities, developed with considerable dialectic

skill, calculates under what real or expected injuries, “the

permitting of what is pleasing to God and the forbidding of what is

displeasing to God” can be dispensed with. Observance with the heart

is always absolutely necessary.But if it is considered as probable to

anyone (law g̲h̲alaba ʿalā z̦annihi) or if he is certain that an

injury will befall him, his property or one of his co-religionists,

then he is released from the obligation to fight for the faith with

hand or tongue.

In S̲h̲īʿī biographies, concealment is a regular feature; we are told

that the hero broke the laws of religion like the prohibition of wine

under compulsion, and this is not always reported as excusable. But

since for them also Muḥammad is the Prophet, and since as among the

Sunnīs a prophet may not practice taḳiyya in matters of his office,

because otherwise one could not be certain of the revelation, we have,

in ¶ view of the double example of the Imāms, in the code of morals

for the ordinary pious men of the S̲h̲īʿa, the following sayings of

ʿAlī in juxtaposition: “It is the mark of belief to prefer to practise

justice even if it injures you, rather than injustice when it is of

use to you”; and as an explanation of sūra XLIX, 13: “He among you who

is most honoured before God is the most fearful (of God)”, that is, he

who uses taḳiyya most (atḳākum = akt̲h̲arukum taḳiyyatan ); and it is

also said “Al-kitmān is our d̲j̲ihād”, but at the same time the

chapters on d̲j̲ihād are to be read with the implied understanding

that the fighting is primarily against other Muslims. It is also to be

noted that the taḳiyya of the S̲h̲īʿīs is not a voluntary ideal (cf.

Ḵh̲wānsārī, Rawd̓āt al-d̲j̲annāt, Tehran 1306/1888, iv, 66-7), but one

should avoid a martyrdom that seems unnecessary and useless and

preserve oneself for the faith and one’s co-religionists.

In any case, because of their attachment to taḳiyya, the S̲h̲īʿīs have

devoted numerous works to it. Ṭihrānī,

inal-Ḏh̲arīʿa,iv,403-4nos.1769-83,givesalistofsome 26 epistles and

other works, including (1) the R. fi ʾl-taḳiyya wa ʾl-id̲h̲āʿa of Abu

ʾl-Mufad̓d̓al S̲h̲aybānī al-Kūfī (d. 387/997); (2) the Taḳiyya of ʿAlī

al-Bakrī (d. 940/1533), of which there is a ms. of 1100/1688 in the

library of S̲h̲. Ḏj̲aʿfar Āl Baḥr al-ʿUlūm in Nad̲j̲af; (3) the R.

al-taḳiyya of Āg̲h̲ā Muḥammad Bāḳir al-Bihbihānī (d. 1206/1791), also

with a ms. at Nad̲j̲af belonging to S̲h̲. Mas̲h̲kūr; (4) the Taḳiyya,

in 600 verses, by Muʿizz al-Dīn Muḥammad al-Ḥillī (d. 1309/1891), of

which there is a ms. in the library of S̲h̲. Hibat al-Dīn

al-S̲h̲ahrastānī; etc.

In the last resort, taḳiyya is based on intention, so we continually

find the appeal made to niyya in this connection. The validity of the

profession of faith as an act of worship is not only settled by the

correct formulation of the intention to do it, but this is the

essential of it, so that it alone counts, if under compulsion a

profession of unbelief is made with the lips or worship performed

along with unbelievers. God’s rights alone can be injured by taḳiyya.

He has the power to punish the constrainer, and only in certain

circumstances will a slight portion of the punishment fall upon the

one constrained. The wiles used in this connection, especially in

oaths with mental reservations give, however, ample opportunities to

injure one’s fellow-creatures.

The moral dangers of taḳiyya are considerable, but it may be compared

with similar phenomena in other religions and even among the mystics.

The ethical question whether such forced lies and denials of the faith

are not still lies and denials of the faith, is not put at all by the

one “who conceals his real views”, as he is not in a state of

confidence which would be broken by lies or denial.

(R. Strothmann-[Moktar Djebli])